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Abstract 
 
What explains the shift from the moderate to high inflation rates of the Golden Age of post-war 
capitalism to the low inflation regime of monetarism in the 1970s and 1980s? Conventional 
views emphasise the rise of monetarism as a new economic paradigm that convinced policy 
makers to delegate monetary policy to conservative and independent central banks – a view that 
comes in many variants, from constructivist to orthodox economics. In contrast to these 
arguments, we introduce electoral and party politics into the debate. This paper models and 
examines the shifts in the inflationary preferences of the median voter and their translation into 
party politics and economic policies. As the median voter accumulates nominal assets against 
a background of de facto and de jure increasing job security and rising wages, her preferences 
on macro-economic policies shift from concerns about employment-friendly to inflation-averse 
policies. Social democratic parties, who are pivotal players in this regard because of their 
‘natural’ preference for high employment over low inflation, are thus forced to adopt anti-
inflation policies as well to remain electorally viable. We show that the employment situation 
of the average worker improved in every respect during the 1960s and 1970s, that most of the 
population became inflation averse during the 1970s and 1980s, and that social democratic 
parties were forced to adopt more economically orthodox party manifestos. We then analyse the 
shift to a low inflation regime in a series of country case studies. 
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Introduction 
Between the end of the Second World War and today, inflation rates varied 
dramatically across countries and over time in Europe. In the 1950s both 
inflation rates and variation across advanced capitalist countries were quite 
high by contemporary standards. In 1956, for instance, inflation was 11.6% in 
Finland, 4.9% in Sweden, almost 5% in the UK, 2.6% in Germany, 5.8% in Spain, 
and 3.8% in Norway (OECD 2016). Despite the relatively high levels in many 
countries, it was rarely identified as a problem, and attention went 
disproportionately to economic growth and the goal of full employment. In 
Austria and Germany, the average growth rate of GDP per capita during the 
1950s was 5.6% (for Austria) and 7% (Germany) 2.2% in France 3.4% in Belgium 
(Maddison 2013 database). During the 1960s, inflation again fluctuated sharply, 
this time against a background of full employment and high economic growth 
– but was not seen as a serious policy problem either. This perception changed 
in the 1970s, when the simultaneous occurrence of high inflation, rising 
unemployment, and low growth was identified as a major economic policy 
problem, with inflation increasingly as the more serious one (see table 1).  
The monetarist interventions of the first half of the 1980s by the Banque de 
France under Mitterrand, the Bank of England under Thatcher and Paul 
Volcker's Federal Reserve heralded a much more subdued inflation regime and 
by 1990, inflation appeared to be conquered, though against a background of 
relatively high equilibrium unemployment rates and low economic growth, 
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both usually understood as problems with their roots in rigid supply-side 
institutions.  
Table 1. Unemployment and inflation between the 1950s and 1980s in Western European countries  Unemployment Inflation (CPI)  1950-1973 1974-1983 1950-1973 1974-1983 Belgium 3% 8.2% 2.9% 8.1% Finland 1.7% 4.7% 5.6% 10.5% France 2% 5.7% 5% 11.2% Germany 2.5% 4.1% 2.7% 4.9% Italy 5.5% 7.2% 3.9% 17.6% Netherlands 2.2% 7.3% 4.1% 6.5% UK 2.8% 7% 4.6% 13.5% Source: Maddison 2001: Table 3.8 page 134.   
What explains this variation both in actual inflation rates and in the political 
interpretation of the problem? That is the central question of this paper. The 
dominant arguments in this debate concentrate on the ideational power of a 
paradigm shift in economic thought; instead, we emphasise the evolution of 
the median voter’s inflationary preferences as a result of increasing economic 
security and the way these translated into party-political programmes and 
economic policies. In a nutshell, the argument goes as follows: as the median 
voter accumulates nominal assets against a background of de facto and de jure 
increasing job security and rising wages, her preferences on macro-economic 
policies shift from concerns about growth and employment to concerns about 
the asset-eroding effect of rising inflation. This shift in the median voter’s 
preferences in turn has important implications for party dynamics: social 
democratic parties, who are pivotal players in this area because of their 
‘natural’ preference for high employment over low inflation, are forced by this 
rightward shift of the median voter to prioritise anti-inflation policies to remain 
electorally viable.  
Bob Hancké and Tim Vlandas 
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The relevance of this question should be obvious. Understanding the political 
dynamics underlying inflation and disinflation is not only important in 
historical perspective; equally important is bringing politics back into the wider 
picture of big shifts in economic policy-making. It is possibly even of 
significance today because of the struggles of OECD economies to generate 
higher inflation in the wake of the Great Recession. For the past decade, most 
advanced capitalist economies have witnessed extremely low inflation, often 
verging on deflation, and with interest rates close to zero, have been forced to 
resort to quasi-fiscal monetary policies (known as ‘quantitative easing’) to 
avoid being stuck pushing on a string, in the words of Keynes. Understanding 
how exactly we got here could shed light on the policy options today.  
The balance of this paper starts with a short review of the debates on the 
disinflation of the 1980s, moves on to a detailed exposition of our argument 
before delving into several empirical subsections on the mechanism that we 
propose. We end that empirical section with a set of short case studies – of the 
UK, France, Germany and Sweden – on the political dynamics surrounding 
disinflation. A short conclusion summarises the findings and raises some 
further questions. 
 
1. Explaining disinflation 
Arguably the single most important set of approaches to the question of low 
inflation and its institutional corollaries builds on an important ideational shift 
in macroeconomic theory. According to the economists’ narrative, as Iversen & 
Soskice (2006) call this, politicians suddenly realised in the 1970s that inflation 
was a bad thing because everyone in the economy anticipated it. Prices thus 
rose without real effects if governments tried to inflate the economy and 
governments, quite sensibly, created institutions, such as conservative, 
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independent central banks, to enforce price stability (in two very different 
versions but with the same conclusion, see Barro & Gordon 1983; McNamara 
1998). The 1970s were the era when the shortcomings of Keynesian macro-
economic policies became clear to everyone; faced with stagnation, a new 
regime, foreshadowed by new macro-economic thinking, was installed. This 
ideational shift was, needless to say, supported by a dramatic rise in the 
perception of the dangers of inflation in the 1970s and 1980s by citizens, 
politicians and interest groups. 
These ideational arguments, powerful as they may seem, face the simple 
problem that every approach based on ideas faces: the defeat of one way of 
understanding the economy and the victory of a competing vision cannot be 
explained, neither ex ante nor ex post, simply with reference to the substance of 
the ideas alone. The notion of sound money at the basis of monetarism has in 
some form or other been around since the formalization of classical economics 
in the 18th century and embodied in the gold standard regime, yet has been 
more or less politically attractive over the past 250 years depending on the 
politics of economic policy, not the functional requirements of economic 
problems. New ideas may be a necessary condition for such shifts, but they are 
far from sufficient.  
Hall’s (1989) interesting ancillary argument about the political conditions for 
policy learning does not really resolve the problem, since policy change, even 
in what may appear to be a highly technical matter such as macro-economic 
policy, requires more than the bureaucratic and elite politics that complement 
these ideational approaches. Put differently, since sustained anti-inflation 
policies have §both short-term and long-term distributional effects, they 
eventually also require approval and support by electorates, and voters, 
especially those groups in the population that are disproportionately hurt by 
Bob Hancké and Tim Vlandas 
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such a shift in macro-economic policy making, may have different ideas about 
the priorities of economic policy.  
In fact, it is not even obvious to what extent the complementary point of a 
growing problem load that focused attention on inflation is convincing. Take 
the countries with comparatively low (average) inflation rates in the 1970s, 
such as Germany (5%), Austria (6%), Belgium (7%) and the Netherlands (7%); 
in all of these, inflation was one of the two most important (economic) policy 
problems, according to opinion polls, usually collecting 65-70% of the votes. 
But in countries that faced comparatively much higher inflation rates over the 
decade – Italy (12%), Ireland (13%) and the UK (13%) – the population did not 
have a higher sense of inflation as a major problem. There is simply not a very 
strong relationship between the inflation rate and feelings about inflation 
across these countries.  
Materialist political scientists, starting with Hibbs (1977), have developed a 
very different argument: Left governments, with a constituency of salaried 
workers depending on employment for their livelihood, cared more about 
unemployment than inflation; for governments of the Right, who represented 
more economically privileged groups in the population, the opposite was the 
case. For these interpretations, inflation is the outcome of domestic distributive 
conflict between Labour and Capital over the surplus generated by economic 
growth (Hirsch & Goldthorpe 1978; Carlin & Soskice 1990). Wage bargaining 
systems where workers can, for a variety of mainly political and institutional 
reasons, systematically claim wage rates that are higher than labour 
productivity rates (i.e. where the wage share in the economy rises), produce, 
all other things equal, higher inflation than those where nominal wages and 
productivity are more closely aligned. Conversely, the increasing weakness of 
Labour after 1980, expressed in declining union density (Visser 2013), 
fragmentation of collective bargaining systems (Katz 1993), and labour market 
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deregulation (Vlandas 2013; Avdagic 2013) allowed capital to capture a larger 
share of economic growth, and inflation rates fell, since businesses did not have 
to raise prices to compensate for losses associated with higher wages. This 
dynamic captures almost perfectly the adjustment from the high-inflation 
1970s to the low-inflation 1990s.  
But this argument also faces a few important problems. The partisan argument 
by Hibbs (1977) certainly sounded persuasive when it was published, but a 
look at party manifestos, government policies and inflation rates since the 
1990s suggests that Left parties of a social-democratic bent have now also 
become inflation hawks, not to be outdone by their Right counterparts (see 
Notermans 2000: 160-221; Boix 2000). Simple correlations between inflation 
rates and Left control of cabinet, as reported in Figure 1, have been negative in 
the period 1999-2005 for much of the OECD. Since the argument about different 
policy preferences of Left and Right held for the 1960s (as in Hibbs 1977), 
something else must have changed after that period to undermine this 
previously robust relationship. 
A more structural materialist argument emphasises the international political-
economic constraints imposed by the sudden turn towards disinflation in the 
US under Fed Chairman Paul Volcker in the early 1980s (Brenner 2000). 
Because of the central role of the dollar in the international monetary system, 
all major convertible currencies were forced to follow the US when the Fed 
dramatically raised interest rates to force inflation down, and the effect was a 
generalised disinflationary bias in the OECD economies. While this 
international monetary framework certainly may have set the direction of 
change, it has a hard time explaining the variation in timing among the 
advanced capitalist economies. As late as 1990, right before the start of the 
Maastricht process leading to EMU, and which heralded a generalised 
disinflation regime across the EU, inflation rates varied from a low of 2.7% in 
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Germany Germany to a high of over 6% in Italy (and over 20% in Greece!) 
(OECD 2016). It was, in fact, not until the late 1990s that inflation rates across 
what was to become EMU converged on the low German inflation rate – more 
Figure 1. The power of the Left and inflation rates in the early 2000s 
 Note: both variables are averages for period 1999-2005. Source: Armingeon et al. 2015. 
than 15 years after the Volcker crackdown. It is difficult to reconcile the sense 
of urgency implied by the structural power argument with the rather laconic 
and slow adjustment of some of the advanced economies in Europe, and all the 
more so because these seem to have had their hand forced by a European 
political development rather than a US dollar-led policy shift. 
In sum, many of the arguments that have been put forward to explain the sharp 
drop in inflation in much of the OECD after 1980 offer necessary pieces of the 
jigsaw puzzle – but at the same time also fail in important respects. The key 
problem with them, we think, is that most of them underestimate the 
importance of politics in economic policy. Whatever the intellectual virtues of 
a particular position on the economy – and remember that many of these 
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supposed virtues remain under discussion – the translation into actual policies 
requires a majority in legislative settings to pass. Put differently, even the most 
brilliant policy idea will not gain political traction if it systematically destroys 
the livelihood of its electorate.  
In this paper, therefore, we aim to bring politics, particularly distributive 
politics, back into the debate, and do so in two steps. The first step models and 
examines the shifts in the economic policy preferences of the median voter: as 
she accumulated nominal assets against a background of de facto and de jure 
rising job security and wages, her preferences on macro-economic policies 
shifted from concern about growth and employment-friendly policies to 
inflation-averse policies. The second is to introduce that development into a 
model of party competition, by examining at which point the median voter had 
shifted sufficiently to the Right (i.e. prefers inflation-averse policies) to carry all 
parties, but especially the pivotal Social-Democrats, along to the Right. Our 
hypothesis is that this shift in party platforms took place after a series of 
electoral defeats by Social-Democratic parties, who misunderstood the 
electoral implications of the improvement in the median voter's economic 
security (for which, ironically, their own policies and policy orientations in the 
post-war period were mainly responsible). Combined, these two points suggest 
that the turn towards inflation-averse policies in the late 1970s and the 1980s is 
the consequence of a shift in the underlying political sociology of the electorate 
and its translation into party platforms. The existence of new concepts of 
macro-economic policy-making that were transmitted through elite networks 
mattered because they provided a more or less coherent theoretical framework 
both to analyse the new world and to offer intellectual foundations for new 
policies – but the median voter dynamic drove the political process. This 
interaction between shifting policy preferences of the median voter and 
electoral success or failure also helps understand why previous periods of high 
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inflation went, in policy terms at least, almost unnoticed. However, once the 
median voter moved to the Right, low inflation became a pervasive policy goal 
across the entire political spectrum. Governments may have forced central 
banks to become conservative and independent to guard price stability, but 
they did so in response to very strong electoral pressures, thus our argument.  
The balance of this paper presents this argument in four stages. We start by 
developing a model that explains shifts in median voter preferences with 
regard to inflation and then links that to the electoral competition to which 
social-democratic parties, the natural proponents of an employment-oriented 
economic policy, were exposed. We then offer descriptive evidence for our 
argument, followed by case studies of four countries – the UK, France, 
Germany and Sweden. The final section concludes by sketching some of the 
wider implications. 
 
2. Shifting macro-economic preferences of the median 
voter 
The first step in our argument deals with the relative preferences of the median 
voter for economic growth and inflation (we assume growth to cover both 
increases in real disposable income and security of employment) and we 
identify two key concepts in that regard. 
The first is the subjective perception of job loss: since current income is entirely 
dependent on wages, and future income depends on the accumulation of 
human capital, a process impeded through unemployment, losing one’s job is 
tantamount to a significant reduction in income, now and in the future, and 
more broadly to a deterioration of future life chances. A higher subjective 
perception of job loss implies that people are relatively speaking more 
concerned about unemployment than about inflation. In one of the few studies 
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on this question, Scheve (2002) documents that greater exposure to 
unemployment risk leads to lower inflation aversion: respondents with more 
weeks of unemployment in the previous year are less inflation averse (Scheve 
2002: 27). In addition, national unemployment rates and individual-level 
aversion to inflation are also negatively correlated (Scheve 2004: 15). 
Unemployed people are less inflation averse, while high-income individuals – 
with a lower risk of costly unemployment – are more so (Scheve 2004: 17). Our 
own analysis of Eurobarometer data from 1970 to 2000 suggests that 
Employment Protection Legislation, which reduces subjective unemployment 
risk, is positively associated with inflation aversion (see table A3 in appendix). 
Using the International Social Science Program (ISSP) data, we also find that 
insiders in permanent employment are more inflation averse than labour 
market outsiders in unemployment and precarious employment (see table A4 
in appendix). Retired individuals, by definition not concerned about current 
and future unemployment risk, are also more inflation averse (Vlandas 2017). 
The second variable starts from the income derived from the accumulation of 
nominal assets such as savings and other monetary income, pension funds and 
(in most places in the OECD) housing, with a relatively fixed (nominal) value 
– or at least until the deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s and 90s. 
Nominal assets have the particular characteristic that their value is eroded by 
inflation above zero; unless that is compensated by increases in value of the 
assets (through rising stock markets, for example, or real estate inflation), 
holders of such assets see their wealth disappear (or at least perceive it that 
way) when inflation is positive. Therefore, if people with assets are, everything 
else equal, more inflation averse, a rise in asset holdings throughout the 
population will lead to a higher degree of inflation aversion regardless of 
inflation actually having that effect of eroding the value of these assets. There 
is very convincing evidence that asset holders are more inflation averse: 
Bob Hancké and Tim Vlandas 
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Scheve’s (2002: 26) analysis of the British Household Panel Survey, which asks 
respondents whether ‘keeping inflation down’ or ‘keeping unemployment 
down’ is the priority, finds ‘clear evidence that ownership of nominal assets 
has a statistically and substantively significant positive effect on inflation 
aversion among citizens’. Similarly, relying on both Eurobarometer and ISSP 
data, Vlandas (2017) also finds that older retired individuals who rely on 
pensions and are more likely to hold assets are also more inflation averse.1 
These two relatively uncontroversial points about the subjective costs of job 
loss and of asset-eroding inflation allow us to build a simple model. Let us start 
by imagining a Taylor-rule type heuristic, which captures the utility function 
of an individual voter as a cost-minimisation problem with relation to the 
output gap (and therefore the negative effects of low growth on employment 
and wages) and inflation. 
The positive externality associated with a small output gap (i.e. the benefit of a 
relatively small output gap that accrues to an individual, especially in terms of 
employment security and wage) is mediated by the subjective perception of the 
costs of job loss E. Similarly, the (perceived or real) costs of inflation are a 
function of nominal assets A. Higher inflation has (or is seen to have) a higher 
cost for those who have accumulated more nominal assets. The following 
stylised developments capture what we are looking for with this model. In 
1955, E was large for a typical voter: full employment was still a distant dream, 
employment protection (EPL) was relatively weak and trade unions had at best 
only recently settled into their roles of guardians of the post-war settlement. 
                                                 
 1 There is some debate about the reasons for inflation aversion among households with mortgages: inflation is not necessarily a negative evolution for them, since rising general price levels can lead to asset inflation, including houses, while inflation erodes debt in mortgages. But rising inflation also produces a restrictive reaction by the central bank, which then (rapidly) increases debt service in a market with variable mortgages such as the UK and the USA and will have a negative effect on the employment rate.  
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However, A was very small (she had accumulated few nominal assets, since 
both real wages and savings rates were low). A similar voter in 1975 (or the 
same one twenty years later; see below) may well have faced a very different 
situation, in which E was relatively small: full employment meant that the 
probability of job loss was very low, strong EPL was policed by strong trade 
unions, and the developed welfare states assured that even without 
employment, replacement incomes were relatively high. The term A, in 
contrast, would have grown considerably and may even have been relatively 
large, represented by more assets in the shape of, amongst others, savings, 
defined benefits pension schemes and mortgaged houses (in an era before 
speculative bubbles). Between 1955 and 1975, therefore, the perception of the 
relative impact of the output gap and inflation almost certainly converged and 
may even have reversed in some countries.  
Figure 2 offers a graphic representation of the problem with notation that we 
will use in the rest of this paper. The vertical axis covers our two variables of 
interest, the subjective perception of job loss (E) and the accumulation of 
nominal assets (A) on an ordinal scale. When the subjective perception of job 
loss is high, the utility that the median voter derives from having a small output 
gap is high because a large output gap is seen as having a large negative effect 
on their employment security; conversely, the greater the accumulation of 
nominal assets, the higher the utility from having a low inflation. The 
horizontal axis covers time. Our argument is that these two variables move, in 
stylised fashion, along the curves E and A, starting out in the first period with 
E significantly above A, the two converging in period II, and A overtaking E in 
period III. Note that this mechanism could cover both individual life cycles – 
in the limiting case, pensioners do not care at all about their employment 
prospects (Vlandas 2017) – and the individual effects of ‘societal development’ 
life cycles, with a different person in the same occupation being considerably 
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more secure in their employment and considerably wealthier in 1975 than their 
counterpart in 1955. 
This slow shift in (relative) preferences for E and A in the electorate over time 
has important political implications. As long as E>A for the median voter, as in 
period I, policy preferences remain Left, i.e. growth (and employment) are 
ranked above low inflation. This is true for Left as well as Right parties, since 
both try to attract the median voter. But as full employment becomes 
entrenched, job security increases (supported by rising EPL), and real wages 
also rise, the subjective perception of job loss E slowly decreases. At the same 
time, nominal assets grow, probably in part as a result of the rise in real wages, 
and E and A converge.  
Figure 2. Graphic representation of the problem 
 
In period III E<A: the median voter’s concern about growth and employment 
has fallen. Full employment, seniority rules, growth in public sector 
employment, strong employment protection, higher skills and educational 
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attainment, and increasing numbers of retirees who are retired for longer all 
have the effect that the median voter’s subjective perception of job loss is very 
low and the importance attached to a small output gap is relatively low as a 
result. At the same time the accumulation of nominal assets such as savings, 
pensions and houses has reached a point where the concern about the erosion 
of their nominal value trumps (the meanwhile considerably smaller) concerns 
about growth and jobs. In period III, therefore, the median voter’s preferences 
have been pulled to the Right, i.e. she has become more sensitive to high 
inflation (with an inflation rate of zero as optimal). 
This dynamic captures quite well the evolution of the political sociology of 
advanced capitalist countries since WW II. After post-war reconstruction, 
salaried employment was crucial as a source of income for the vast majority of 
the population in most western European countries, even in those where 
agriculture was still an important sector, such as France and Italy. On average, 
wage earners made up the majority of the active population among western 
European nations. Households spent a considerable amount of their income on 
food and housing. In 1953-4, for instance, a household with two adults and two 
children in the middle of the income distribution would be spending 40% of its 
income on food in the UK and 42% in Germany (Kramper 2000: 53). At the same 
time, very few voters had accumulated significant assets. For instance, the US 
homeownership rate was only 43.6% in 1940 (Davis 2012) and most households 
in Europe rented their house in 1945 (Horsewood & Dol 2013: 4). The welfare 
state was also fairly limited, with social expenditures as a proportion of GDP 
below 15% in most European countries in the 1950s (Flora 1986): household 
income thus was primarily if not solely the result of salaried employment. 
Human capital was generally quite low: in 1950 less than 50% of the population 
between 25-64 years of age in OECD countries had completed upper secondary 
education or higher (OECD 2001: 84, Fig B6). This overall constellation 
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corresponds with period I in our model above, in which E>A for the median 
voter.  
During the Wirtschaftwunder, the trente glorieuses and generally the Golden Age 
of Capitalism in the late 1950s, the 1960s and the early 1970s, full employment 
policies, employment protection and growing real wages significantly reduced 
the threat of unemployment and poverty for the vast majority of the 
population.2 Disposable real income rose fast during that period and doubled 
or more in the two decades between 1955 and 1975. In the 1951-55 and 1956-65 
periods, for example, average annual real wage growth was consistently above 
5% and above 7% in West Germany, above 5% and above 3% in France, above 
3% and above 2% in the US and slightly less than 2% and above 3% in the UK 
(Brown & Darby 1985: 249). As a result, the share of income spent on food fell 
significantly, to 26% in the UK and 30% in Germany in 1973 (Kramper 2000: 
53). Job security increased significantly as a result of tight labour markets and 
institutional safeguards such as increased employment protection, guarded by 
courts and trade unions, which also ensured wage increases in line with 
productivity growth. And, lest we forget the shifting composition of the 
workforce, a growing share was employed by government in public services, 
usually with stable life-time employment contracts: by the late 1970s the public 
sector accounted for more than 25% of employment in most of the OECD. 
Higher real incomes also meant that savings could partly be channelled into 
assets such as pension funds and housing. Thus for instance, the US 
homeownership rate increased from 55% in 1950 to 62.1% in 1960, 64.2% in 
1970, and 65.6% in 1980 (Davis 2012: 3). Between 1970 and 1980 the home 
ownership share as a percentage of the housing stock rose from 41% to 48% in 
                                                 
 2 The growth rate of per capita GDP for Western Europe was 4.08% in 1950-1973 – the highest growth rate in recorded history (Maddison 2001: 126). 
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Austria, from 45% to 51% in France, from 49% to 56% in the UK, and from 50 
to 59% in Italy (Horsewood & Dol 2013: 4). Social expenditures increased 
significantly reaching more than 25% by the late 1970s in most European 
countries (Flora 1986), thus providing substantial replacement income if 
citizens were unable to work. This generalized increase in employment security 
and accumulation of assets in the advanced capitalist world corresponds to the 
stylised period II in our model, in which E and A converge. 
After the 1970s and in part supported by government policies, the 
accumulation of nominal assets started to spread quickly across the population. 
For instance in the UK, household total financial assets expanded massively 
from 1957 onwards, from 43 billion British Pound Sterling in 1957 to GBP 106 
billion in 1970, and GBP 304 billion in 1980 (Sbano 2008: 47). At the same time, 
financial assets also grew in value. The index of the share price (with 1989 as 
100) increased from 2.4 in 1950 to 19.8 in 1973 and to 100 in 1989 in France, from 
3.6 to 33.5 to 100 in Germany, from 3.1 to 15.2 and to 100 in UK, and from 5.2 to 
32.6 and to 100 in US (Maddison 2001: 141). Real disposable income rose to 
being twice as high, or more, than in the previous generation, which translated 
into higher savings. In addition, despite rising aggregate unemployment rates 
in the 1970s, job security and the chance of obtaining paid employment was 
actually de facto very high for the vast majority of the workforce, especially 
those with formal secondary and tertiary education.3 A large and rising share 
of the electorate grew older, eventually exiting the labour market and 
becoming increasingly reliant on pensions and income derived from nominal 
assets rather than work (Vlandas 2017). 
                                                 
 3 In a context where education to upper secondary level or higher increased from under 50% to more than 60% in the 1970s in OECD countries (OECD 2001: 84). 
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These developments are captured by period III in our model, when E<A: for 
the vast majority of the working (and voting) population, the threat of long-
term unemployment had become extremely low or inexistent, and households 
had become a lot wealthier as a result of disposable income growing beyond 
immediate needs. The fall in both market and post-tax income inequality 
between the 1950s and the 1990s also secured a relatively homogenous spread 
of income growth in most OECD economies, and especially the continental 
European and Nordic countries. At some point after the 1960s (or the 1970s in 
some countries), therefore, E<A. The possibility of unemployment and the cost 
associated with job loss had fallen dramatically for most of the (working) 
population, and the median voter’s preference ordering shifted from Left (with 
employment concerns trumping inflation aversion) to Right.  
Obviously, the stylized picture painted here is exactly that: a stylized picture 
that needs to be refined by bringing in variations across the economies of the 
OECD. The type of capitalism in a country, its demographic evolution, the 
timing of different stages of industrialization and de-industrialization, and 
other exogenous factors can influence these developments. For now, the central 
message to take away from this analysis is that for the median voter after the 
Second World War, the relative weights of employment (and economic 
growth), symbolised by ‘E’ in our model, and accumulated nominal assets, ‘A’ 
in the model, reversed in her preference ordering. With it came, as we will 
document in the next sections, an increased fear of inflation – which translated 
into a shift to the Right in terms of preferences of economic policy-making 
 
3. From median voter to policies  
The second step in our argument tries to understand how the shifting 
preferences of the median voter found an expression in party platforms and 
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policy options. By making this process a problem rather than simply assuming 
it away as most median voters have done, we begin to address a point that is 
often ignored in studies relying on the median voter as a central driver of 
politics. We know that if the median voter’s subjective perception of the loss 
associated with inflation trumps the loss associated with possible 
unemployment, she moves to the Right. But what then? Not only would a 
median voter model whereby her preferences are immediately mapped onto 
positions of parties strictly speaking only hold in pure majoritarian systems (of 
which there are actually very few in continental Europe: France and Italy, who 
come closest, effectively are diluted majoritarian systems); there is also the 
question of how, why and when positions adopted by the median voter find 
their way into party policy platforms. To take an example from another policy 
area: the median voter might well be in favour of reintroducing the death 
penalty for violent crimes that involve minors as victims, or in the USA the 
median voter is presumably not averse to (cheaper) universal health care. Yet 
neither of these policies has been adopted. There seems to be a missing step in 
the median voter–policy nexus. Assuming that median voter preferences steer 
the political agenda, the question is how changes in those preferences with 
regard to macro-economic outcomes – inflation versus growth and 
unemployment in our case – led to changes in policies?  
We think that policy areas, and positions in policy areas, are ‘owned’ by 
political parties: Social democratic (SD) parties play a pivotal role in this 
particular economic policy. Think of SD parties (along the lines of what we did 
above) as the ‘natural’ expression of the preferences of the median voter in a 
world in which economic insecurity trumps (modest) wealth accumulation 
(E>A). Since all other parties are to the Right of the SD parties and therefore 
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always prefer relatively more restrictive macro-economic policies4, the critical 
shift happens when SD parties also adopt more restrictive monetary policies, 
since that pushes the entire policy area considerably to the Right. This changes 
the question from a rather general 'when did parties or policy-making move to 
the Right?' to a narrower and more specific 'how and when did SD parties move 
to the Right on macro-economic policy?’. 
Our central hypothesis in this regard builds directly on the median voter model 
above: if the median voter has become more conservative in terms of macro-
economic policy preferences when E<A, SD parties followed the median voter 
after defeats with an employment-oriented manifesto (where E > A), by also 
adopting inflation-averse policies as the priority. As a result, the economic 
policy spectrum moved dramatically to the Right, because all other parties to 
the Right of the SD parties had already attributed higher values to A than to E 
in the past, and only electoral competition anchored them on a growth-friendly 
path at that time. In effect the dynamics of the median voter's concern for her 
accumulated wealth against a background of negligible economic insecurity 
forced the SD parties to the Right in economic policy terms. 
More formally, consider the dynamics between the median voter (MV) and SD 
parties in a one-dimensional space with three parties, Left (L), Centre (C) and 
Right (R), in which all three parties command (to keep things simple) one-third 
of the vote, and C can form coalitions with both L and R. In period I (when E>A 
in the MV’s preference ordering), L and C combined command more than 50% 
of the vote. Since the median voter’s preference ordering is E>A, L reflects the 
plurality of the voters, L and C have a majority (with C tactically choosing to 
                                                 
 4 We treat Communist parties as similar to SD on this dimension and ignore the – usually Right – populist parties that have a strong exclusionary, 'national' social dimension in their policies, but usually have very little of intelligence to offer on macro-economic policy. With very few exceptions these far Left and far Right parties have in fact played only a very small role in actual election outcomes. 
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follow L’s lead on macroeconomic policy to avoid electoral penalties in the next 
election) and economic policy remains more sensitive to employment than 
inflation. Again, to keep things simple, assume that the share of the vote does 
not change dramatically from one election to the next (but might obviously 
change significantly over longer periods of time).  
In Period II, when E=A for the MV, C can now effectively choose between L 
and R, without the risk of electoral penalties: the MV is, as it were, indifferent 
between E and A. Both a CL and a CR coalition yield a viable majority. C might 
want to stay in a coalition with L for reasons that are unrelated to this particular 
economic policy stance. Yet if C reads the move of the MV as a permanent shift 
to the Right, it will also consider and actively pursue a coalition with R (since 
that will allow C to reflect preference shifts more accurately and tactically reap 
electoral rewards by combining hawkish policies on inflation with more dovish 
positions on other policies outside macro-economics). That heralds period III: 
E<A for the MV and the CR coalition is now entrenched.  
Meanwhile L can hold on to expansive policies as long as that is part of the 
coalition with C. As the MV’s preferences move to the Right, L can hold out as 
the employment and growth-friendly alternative but will ultimately be forced 
to adopt a policy that is closer to R than to the original L position lest it stumbles 
from one election defeat to another and sees its electoral basis decline. With 
that conversion on macro-economics by the social-democratic parties, inflation 
aversion has become the new centre in the political system, reflecting the MV’s 
preferences for low inflation. 
The next sections provide descriptive and analytical empirical evidence for 
these arguments – first of the shift rightwards in median voter preferences and 
then for the translation of this into social democratic party platforms as a result 
of electoral competition. 
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4. The moving median voter and the shifting party system 
Figures 3-8 present a first systematic descriptive picture of how the preferences 
of the median voter in OECD countries have evolved since the early 1960s. 
These graphs suggest very strongly that the employment situation of the 
average voter (including their families) improved significantly in every respect 
during the 1960s and 1970s while the accumulation of nominal assets increased 
at the same time. The majority of the population became inflation averse in the 
1970s and early 1980s, which in turn forced social democratic parties to become 
more economically orthodox. 
In the 1960s, the average unemployment rate was extremely low in most OECD 
countries5, even by the full-employment standards of that period (see figure 3). 
At the same time, the institutional protection against job loss increased 
significantly as shown by the Employment Protection Legislation indicator 
developed by Allard (2005): the average across 19 OECD countries 6  rose 
consistently throughout the 1960s and 1970s and levelled off in the early 1980s 
(figure 4). Both macro-economic policies and class politics thus combined to 
make employment more secure.7 
To some extent this reflected the organized power of the working class: average 
union strength in 21 OECD countries, measured as the proportion of employees 
who are union members (density) increased throughout the 1960s and 70s, to 
level off in the early 1980s (Figure 5 also makes clear how precipitous and 
dramatic the decline has been since then). In addition, as women entered the 
labour market many households in the OECD were or became two-income 
                                                 
 5 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 6 Due to data availability the analysis excludes Portugal and Greece.  7 See data on unemployment risk in Rehm’s latest book (2016). 
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earner families in the 1970s and early 1980s. The data are not consistently 
available since 1960 to calculate a meaningful cross-country average but 
individual cases suggest that many countries had high female employment 
rates by 1970s and 1980s (see table 2). Even if unemployment rates among men 
increased, this means that in many countries possibly 60-65% of households 
could rely on two incomes. 
Figure 3: Low unemployment in 1960s and 70s in OECD countries 
 
Figure 4: EPL rises from 60s to 80s in OECD countries 
 
 
Figure 5: Union strength rises in 60s and 70s in OECD  
 
Figure 6: Housing ownership increases in OECD 
 
 
If we take the owner occupancy rate in housing (housing/home ownership) as 
a proxy for assets, an interesting picture emerges. Against this background of 
increasing employment security (and broader social protection and economic 
security), average households slowly became wealthier. As Figure 6 shows, 
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home ownership rates in the OECD 8  rose quickly from about half of the 
occupancies in 1960 to almost 58% in 1980, and leveled off by 1990 just below 
60%. 
Table 2. Female employment rates passing 50% threshold in selected countries Country Earliest data Year of earliest data First available data point above 50% Country for which data<50% exist Canada 47% 1976 51% 1979 Germany 46% 1970 51% 1989 Norway 48% 1972 59% 1975 US 39% 1960 51% 1977 First data point suggests these countries had already passed the 50% mark early on Finland 60% 1963 64% 1979 Sweden 53% 1963 70% 1978 Japan 53% 1968   First available datapoint in 1980s Australia 52% 1986   Denmark 64% 1983   France 50% 1983   New Zealand 60% 1986   UK 1984    Source: The following examples are rounded and taken from the comparative politics dataset (Armingeon et al. 2015). 
To compare our proxy for assets with what happened to subjective 
employment insecurity requires creating an index for the latter, which is more 
complicated. An obvious choice would be the unemployment rate but this may 
be related to inflation through a direct economic (short-term Phillips curve) 
mechanism rather than the political and policy channel that we explore here. 
Unemployment may also be a poor predictor of insecurity when income 
replacement rates are high and/or strong EPL means that insiders do not face a 
large risk of being unemployed in dualised economies (see Rueda 2007; 
Emmenegger et al. 2012). We therefore choose to rely on two main variables to 
create an index of labour market security: Employment Protection Legislation, 
which captures job security, and educational attainment in years, which captures 
                                                 
 8 The cross-national average excludes Greece and Portugal due to a lack of data. 
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(the increased development of) human capital. EPL could be argued to have a 
positive impact on wages, but this then actually stacks the cards against our 
argument because if this effect were to dominate, the correlation between EPL 
and inflation would be positive (think of this as the conventional new 
Keynesian view, as in Carlin and Soskice (2006), or the Kaleckian view, both of 
which suggest that the inflation rate rises if job security increases). 
Figure 7. Labour market insecurity and asset ownership, cross-country average 
 
 
In Figure 7, we plot the cross-country average of the inverse9 of our index of 
labour market security and our index of asset ownership. Both indices are 
standardised with a standard deviation of 1 and mean of 0, which allows us to 
evaluate in which period our cross-country average was under or above the 
average for the whole sample for each index. Before 1980, labour market 
insecurity was high (i.e. the inverse of security was high, meaning that labour 
                                                 
 9 We calculate the inverse to facilitate the identification of the point at which the curve for the rise of home ownership crosses the curve capturing labour market security. 
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market security was low) while home ownership was low. Around 1980, labour 
market insecurity fell below the average for the period 1960-2003 while home 
ownership rose above the period average. This is an encouraging result, as it is 
almost exactly what we anticipated in our model and which was graphically 
represented in figure 2. 
The results of this combination of (perceived) increased employment security 
and accumulation of assets was that the majority of the population – which 
obviously included the median voter – became considerably more inflation 
averse in the 1970s and early 1980s. Figure 8 shows the percentage of 
respondents in the integrated Eurobarometer trend survey that identify 
inflation as the first or second priority. Unfortunately, since the data only start 
in the mid-1970s we cannot investigate inflationary preferences in the 1950s. 
We can see that inflation aversion on the whole was very high in the 1970s and 
only started to fall after social democratic parties had also become more 
economically orthodox.  
However, the case of the US, where Gallup surveys have been carried out 
further back in time suggests that inflation was identified as the nation’s most 
important problem by less than 30% of the public in the 1950s and 1960s (and 
at times by considerably fewer people) but by more than 50% and at times more 
than 70% of the respondents in the 1970s (Fischer and Huizinga 1980: Figure 1, 
page 5)10. Hibbs (1982: 224) also found that ‘popular support for the President 
                                                 
 10 Smith (1980: 169-170) similarly finds that: ‘Figure 4 shows what proportion of all economic responses mentioned inflation. Low points occurred in 1949, 1954, 1958, and 1961, during postwar recessions, and similar drops appeared during the 1970-71 slowdown and the 1975 recession. Peaks appeared in 1966 and 1974. The 1966 point in part reflects the beginning of the 1966-1975 inflationary spiral, but in part appears to reflect the relative absence of unemployment and other economic problems at that time. The 1974 crest, on the other hand, probably reflects the double-digit inflation that crested that year rather than the absence of other economic concerns. The secular trend, once the large cyclical swings are set aside, was for inflation to decline as the prime economic problem from the late 1940s to 1961 (note that each trough hits bottom at a lower level) and for it to rise as an economic concern from 1961 to the mid-1970s.’ 
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was relatively more sensitive to nominal, inflation economic performance than 
to real economic performance in the 1970s than in the previous decade. In the 
1960s the mean of the real elasticities was about twice the mean of the inflation 
elasticities (0.3 versus 0.14); in the 1970s the average real and nominal 
elasticities were both in the vicinity of one-half. By the second quarter of 1980 
the relative impact of inflation on political support had increased enormously.’ 
Figure 8: Inflation aversion peaked in 1970s and early 1980s 
 
Figure 9: Average ‘economic orthodoxy’ of party manifesto 
 
 
 
 
The top panel of Figure 9 maps the degree of ‘economic orthodoxy’ in every 
decade covered by the party manifesto database (Volkens et al. 2014) and 
shows very clearly that social democratic parties became more economically 
orthodox in the 1970s, reached a peak in the 1980s, which remained stable in 
the 1990s and only started to fall in the 2000s – when inflation was no longer a 
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economists (although it never ceased to be one for central bankers, as we saw 
during the onset of the financial crisis). If we focus only on western European 
countries11, shown in the bottom panel of Figure 9, social democratic parties 
became more orthodox in the 1970s and continued to become more orthodox 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Following a decade of low inflation the manifestos of 
both the social democratic parties and their right-wing counterparts had 
become very similar in terms of adherence to economic orthodoxy. 
In general terms, therefore, these aggregate figures suggest that the three 
phenomena more or less follow our logic: with the increase of employment 
security, and the accumulation of nominal wealth, the move to the Right of the 
median voter in turn brings about a shift to the Right of SD parties in their 
economic policy platforms. 
 
5. Economic security, inflation aversion, party orthodoxy 
and inflation 
In figures 10-12, we present several combinations of relevant variables that 
allow us to explore, at least descriptively, the key causal relationships in our 
argument. We systematically plotted shifts in one of our independent variables 
in the argument in a decade against shifts in the following decade – for 
economic security, inflation aversion, party manifestos, and actual effects on 
inflation rates. 
Figure 10 plots the relation between our index of economic security (which 
combines the two indices of labour market security – not the previously 
constructed inverted version – and assets presented in Figure 7) and the mean 
                                                 
 11 The following countries are included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
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inflation aversion in the 1980s. That association is positive, although the spread 
of cases across the two-dimensional space is large, with Belgium and Denmark, 
Figure 10.  Security and party manifesto economic orthodoxy in the 1980s 
 
 
Figure 11. Inflation aversion and party manifesto economic orthodoxy 
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for example, scoring roughly equally high on the economic security index but 
found on opposite sides of the party orthodoxy score. The bivariate correlation 
coefficient associated with the data in Figure 10 is 0.39 (with a p-value of 0.30). 
Inflation aversion, in turn, is positively correlated with higher economic 
orthodoxy of parties in the decade that follows, as figure 11 demonstrates. The 
Figure 12.  Party manifesto economic orthodoxy in a decade and inflation in the next decade 
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economic orthodoxy (the coefficient was equal to 2.59 with a p-value equal to 
0.087), while the within-R2 is 0.57; these two variables alone thus explain 57% 
of the variation in economic orthodoxy in a country in a given decade. Finally, 
figure 12 shows – tentatively - that the economic orthodoxy of party manifestos 
is, in turn, associated with lower inflation in the next decade. 
Table 3.  Security and inflation Column (1) (2) (3) (4) Dependent variable Inflation rate Inflation rate Inflation rate Inflation rate Index of security -3.50** -1.43*   
(standard normal) (1.047) (0.635)   Index of labour market security   -1.52*  
(standard normal)   (0.554)  Index of security 2    -2.37*** (standard normal, with share of elderly)    (0.502) GDP growth rate -1.39 -0.18 -0.15 -1.03 
(standard normal) (1.454) (0.977) (0.783) (0.642) Unemployment rate -0.60 -0.65* -0.51t -0.57* 
(standard normal) (0.498) (0.259) (0.281) (0.229) Left control of cabinet  -0.12 -0.24 -0.11 
(standard normal)  (0.501) (0.468) (0.465) Union density  1.42 1.28* 1.41t 
(standard normal)  (0.842) (0.518) (0.686) Trade openness  -0.51 0.01 -0.43 
(standard normal)  (0.556) (0.658) (0.559) Capital openness  -2.42*** -2.71*** -2.06*** 
(standard normal)  (0.439) (0.385) (0.436) CBI  -0.10 -0.32 0.01 
(standard normal)  (0.325) (0.367) (0.358) Constant 6.38*** 6.28*** 6.26*** 6.65***  (0.314) (0.256) (0.169) (0.191) Observations 79 73 78 73 Number of countries 19 19 20 19 Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes R-squared within model 0.40 0.87 0.89 0.90 R-squared overall model 0.03 0.62 0.74 0.61 R-squared between model 0.40 0.04 0.41 0.00 Note: robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; t p<0.1. The sample is composed of 10 years period average: 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. 
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Results from a preliminary regression analysis on a sample of 21 OECD 
countries in the period 1950s-2000s seem to confirm our hypothesis (see table 
3). Our regression analysis reports robust standard errors clustered by country, 
includes country fixed effects and is carried out on 10-years period average to 
capture the fact that we are looking at slow moving shifts in variables rather 
than year-on-year variation. Column 1 suggests that our index of security 
combining both labour market security and home ownership (shown in Figure 
7) is negatively correlated with inflation when controlling for GDP growth and 
unemployment. Adding Left control of cabinet, union density, central bank 
independence, and trade as well as capital openness does not change the results 
(column 2). In column 3, we show that focusing just on labour market security 
while excluding assets does not change the results. Adding the share of elderly 
in our index to capture the fact that the elderly are more inflation averse and 
unaffected by labour market insecurity (see Vlandas 2017) does not change the 
results (column 4). 
If we use yearly data the results do not change (table A2 in appendix). One 
could argue that this correlation is coincidental and driven by the high inflation 
and low security of the 1970s. In column 3 of table A2, we therefore restrict the 
sample to the moderately low-inflation post-1978 period: our index of 
economic security is still statistically significant. In column 4, we investigate 
whether the results are robust to the exclusion of country fixed effects: union 
density is no longer significant but our index of economic security remains 
significant with the correct sign. In columns (5) and (6), we take the first and 
second lags, respectively, of our key independent variables (except for GDP 
growth). In column 7 we present the results when we run the regression on 5-
years period averages and in columns 8 to 10 we try alternative specifications 
of our index of security. The main results are unchanged. Finally in column 11, 
 
 
The Politics of Disinflation 
 
 32 
we add union density to this index of economic security (which as a result 
becomes composed of EPL, educational attainment, housing ownership, the 
share of elderly and union density): the coefficient is still negative and 
significant at the 10% level. Finally, we have also rerun the yearly analysis 
using an error correction model (ECM)12 which suggest our index of security 
has a significant negative long run effect on inflation but no short term effect 
(not included in this paper but available from authors). 
An important caveat at this stage is that there are potentially important 
methodological problems with such a regression analysis because of the nature 
of our dependent variable and argument. Our aim is to explain a regime shift 
– from Keynesianism to monetarism (captured in the transition from 
moderate/high to low inflation), which happens at a single point in time in all 
developed countries (though not necessarily at the same time), and not the cross-
national variation in inflation across countries and time. In addition, we argue that 
this shift was driven by a combination of changes in the economic conditions of 
the electorate, which fed into their inflation preferences and in turn into 
political parties’ economic orthodoxy. Economic insecurity might also be 
endogenous to inflation, at least partly. As a result the correlational logic 
underpinning regression analysis might not provide a good test of our 
argument, which is why we pay more heed to the careful historical analysis of 
how these shifts have occurred in Western Europe in the next section.13 
                                                 
 12 Panel data unit root tests on the yearly sample reject the null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root for inflation but not for our index of security so the latter may be non-stationary. ECMs are designed to handle non-stationarity. The error correction coefficient is statistically significant suggesting both series are co-integrated (i.e. the error term is stationary) and hence the inference from the ECM is valid. 13 Focusing on the impact of ageing is more promising from a statistical perspective because the share of ageing is exogenous to inflation. Ageing on its own is unlikely to lead to a shift in the inflation regime, but if we are right we should observe that countries where the share of people above 65 is larger also have lower inflation. This is precisely what Vlandas (2017) finds using a wide range of methods and samples. He provides robust statistical evidence for the part of our argument that is exogenous to inflation and can be expected to have a cross-national effect. 
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That said, we have thus far found highly suggestive aggregate historical, 
descriptive cross-national, and statistical-analytical evidence for our argument. 
But the analysis was carried at a level of aggregation that makes it hard to trace 
the process through which changing economic conditions feed, through the 
electorate, into shifts in party positions. This is what we do in the next section. 
 
6. Case studies: the UK, France, Germany and Sweden  
The dynamics between the median voter and social-democratic parties are the 
subject of four short case studies of the UK, France, Germany and Sweden, 
more or less going back to the mid-1960s. The four countries embody the main 
broad political-economic models found in Western Europe, thus maximising 
the differences between these systems: this suggests that the causal mechanism 
operates regardless of broader historical-institutional background conditions 
(see also Hall 2007 on these four). In addition, they also teach us something 
more immediate with regard to the argument that links median voters and 
social-democratic parties. Across these four cases, we will go from a pure 
majoritarian electoral system, where median voter preferences directly 
influence the electoral fortunes of social-democratic parties, to a pure 
proportional system in Germany and Sweden – but with the latter having a 
hegemonic social-democratic party that can, to some extent at least, shield itself 
from direct electoral competition on macroeconomic policies. That means that 
we have both cases of high median voter influence (the UK and, to a lesser 
extent, France), cases of party competition beyond a simple dyad and, in the 
latter, even one with low levels of multi-party competition. 
United Kingdom: From Thatcher to Blair via low inflation 
We start with the United Kingdom, the country in Europe with a straight 
majoritarian electoral system. Here the logic implied by our argument unfolds 
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quite nicely. In essence the story starts, not unsurprisingly, with Margaret 
Thatcher’s election victory in 1979. The policies the Conservative Prime 
Minister adopted afterwards grafted themselves onto slow shifts in the 
economic situation of the median voter, with the effect that Thatcher de facto 
changed the profile of the latter. While her government initially was not off to 
an auspicious start, once unemployment fell in the mid-1980s, the fear of job 
loss also fell significantly as a result of a previously large increase in education, 
possibly the single best predictor of increased life chances and especially low 
unemployment in the late 1980s and 1990s. This came on the back of a 
significant reduction in working hours during the post-war boom years 
(Sutcliffe 1996: 147). In addition, the combination of lower taxes and financial 
deregulation induced a ‘wealth effect’ among voters (Crouch 2009).  
For figure 13 (and figures 14-16) we calculated an index of support for 
economic orthodoxy. For every party in every election since the Second World 
War, we multiplied the manifesto ‘orthodoxy score’ and the percentage of the 
vote that party received. We then added, for every election, these scores to 
obtain an overall score of support for orthodox policies in the electorate during 
that election, and plotted those for every election. A high score on this measure 
indicates that many people voted for a party with a high score on economic 
orthodoxy. The graph in Figure 13 shows quite clearly the spike in the index of 
support for economic orthodoxy. The level of support, highly subdued during 
most of the 1970s (despite high inflation rates of 20% or more), actually falls for 
most of the decade. Estimates of changes in political support in response to 
economic outcomes for the period 1959-1978 suggests that the fall in support 
was almost twice as high for an increase of two points in unemployment than 
for an increase of two points in inflation (Hibbs 1985: 184). In the late 1970s, it 
started to rise sharply, never to fall until inflation was below 4% in the early 
1990s.  
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In terms of our median voter E-A model developed in Section 2, the subjective 
perception of costs associated with unemployment (E) fell for large segments 
of the population, while the nominal value of assets (associated with A) rose 
rapidly. This undermined the classical social-democratic electoral strategy of 
Labour, based on E>A, and locked in the median voter on the Right of the 
economic spectrum, more concerned about inflation than about employment 
and growth. 
Figure 13.  The evolution of support for economic orthodoxy in UK 
 Source: Orthodoxy support is the sum of [vote share for party i (=1,...,n) times economic orthodoxy of party i (=1,...,n)], for all political parties in an election (see detailed explanation in the text). 
 
Labour responded to Thatcher’s victory by moving considerably to the Left, 
writing what was, in effect, a socialist electoral programme for the 1983 
elections. Voters in 1983 viewed Labour as prioritising unemployment much 
more than inflation while the reverse was true for the Tories (Clarke 1986: 128). 
An analysis of popularity in the period 1979 to 1983 reveals that one percentage 
point in inflation cost the Labour party roughly one third of a point in support 
(ibid: 132). The headwinds for Labour associated with the split in the party and 
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the ultra-patriotic mood in the country after the Falklands war, both of which 
have been invoked as reasons for Labour’s defeat that year, certainly made 
things worse for the party, but they should not divert attention from the long-
term development in the British electorate towards explicit inflation aversion. 
In response, the Kinnock years saw a gradual move to the centre-Left, 
symbolized in the struggles against the socialist factions that had organized 
within the Labour party. On macroeconomics, the party adopted a 
considerably more orthodox platform for the 1987 election than it had done 
even in the late 1970s (when inflation was, in fact, rampant and thus arguably 
required a vigorous policy response): the score for orthodoxy as recorded in 
the Party Manifestos Project shot up from close to zero in 1983 to 2.5 out of 5 in 
1987. The Labour party gained ground in the election that year, but remained 
nonetheless over 10 percentage points behind the Tories. By 1992, the Tories 
and Labour were neck-and-neck in the election, which Labour lost narrowly, 
but in the 1997 election, Labour won a massive majority with an election 
manifesto that scored 4.5 on economic orthodoxy – effectively moving to the 
Right of the Conservatives. Keen to brandish their new credentials, once in 
office, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown handed operational independence to the 
Bank of England, thus sealing the fight against inflation AND against growth-
oriented Keynesianism in their own party – at least until the financial crisis of 
2008.  
In sum, once the median voter’s preferences had moved from concern over 
growth and employment to fear of inflation, Labour slowly followed suit, and 
ended up being more orthodox than the Conservative Party. In a dramatic and 
highly symbolic move a few days after Labour’s election victory in 1997, the 
Blair government handed the Bank of England political independence: in that 
new inflation-targeting regime the government set the target and appointed 
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governors, but the latter, in the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank, were 
given the autonomy to decide how to meet the target. 
 
France: from socialism in one country to competitive disinflation 
A very similar process took place in France, our second case. Under the Fifth 
Republic the Left took a long time getting to power, and was elected in 1981 on 
what would today be considered a far-Left programme, while at the same time, 
the electorate was slowly moving to the Right on economic policy issues. The 
conversion to a soft version of monetarism and inflation targeting followed a 
series of defeats against the centre-Right and, very importantly, a series of 
struggles within the Socialist Party – but ultimately the French Left ended up 
in a very similar position to Labour (pushed there, to some extent, by European 
economic policy constraints), after a very similar conversion. 
The place to start the French case study is the post-war boom. Between the end 
of post-war reconstruction (around 1950) and the second oil shock in 1979, the 
French lived through what became known as the ‘Trente Glorieuses’ (or 
‘Glorious Thirty’, in the words of Fourastié 1979). The country modernised its 
economy and industry, becoming the best pupil of Taylorism and Fordism on 
the continent (Hancké 2002), while standards of living for the average family 
almost doubled during the first twenty years of that period: spending on food 
and clothing took up roughly 65% of household’s consumption in 1950, fell to 
54% in 1959, and to 44.5 % in 1968 (Sutcliffe 1996: 145), while average annual 
working hours fell by more than 250 hours between 1950 and 1973 (Sutcliffe 
1996: 147). Wealth was slowly accumulated, while job security increased 
dramatically for the majority of workers. Private savings as a fraction of 
national income had increased significantly during the 1950s and 1960s and 
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remained high in the 1970s.14 From its lowest point in the 20th century after the 
Second World War, the wealth to disposable income ratio increased from under 
300% to over 400% by the late 1970s and early 1980s.15 Temporary work was 
regulated in the 1970s (Vlandas 2013) while the EPL index (developed by 
Allard 2005) shot up from 0.1 in 1960 to 2.3 in 1980, 2.8 in 1985 and 3 in 1990. 
Educational attainment also increased sharply in the 1980s, on the back of 
government policies to have over 75% of a cohort pass their certificate of 
secondary studies, the Baccalauréat, by 1994 (up from 25% in 1984), and go on 
to higher studies, in technical or academic colleges and universities. In effect, 
by the mid-1980s, inflation looked like a far more important problem for the 
vast majority of the French than unemployment – despite the jump in the 
unemployment rate in the previous years. More than 70% of respondents to the 
standard Eurobarometer survey put inflation as the first or second biggest 
problem in the early 1980s. This contrasts markedly with the political 
importance of inflation prior to that. Though the Eurobarometer does not have 
data on inflation aversion, in an analysis of presidential approval ratings and 
economic indicators in the period 1969 to 1978, Hibbs and Vasilatos (1981: 52-
3) find that inflation did not have a statistically significant impact whereas the 
growth of real income did.  
Most of French post-war economic history can be understood as a combination 
of rapid, centralized supply side modernization, and a fight against resulting 
inflation, either through wage repression (Ross 1982) or through ultimately 
self-defeating devaluations (which make exports cheaper while making 
imports, in what is a very open economy, more expensive and thus fuel 
inflation). This tension came to a head in the social explosion of May 1968 
                                                 
 14 See figure 11, http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/EU%20Wealth%2023-11-2010.pdf 15 See figure 5, http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/EU%20Wealth%2023-11-2010.pdf 
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(Howell 1989), which partly modernized the wage-setting system, but also led 
to a devaluation of the Franc by more than 10%. The attempt by President De 
Gaulle to have his social policies ratified through a referendum backfired and 
after the General’s resignation, the 1969 presidential election turned into a 
massive defeat for the candidate of the Left, Gaston Defferre, with only 5% of 
the vote and shut out of the second round. François Mitterrand took advantage 
of this defeat to agglomerate all the Left parties (one of them was called, 
somewhat anachronistically in an era of predominantly national politics, the 
‘French Section of the Workers’ International’ or SFIO) and founded the Parti 
Socialiste (PS), a Left-leaning centre-Left party in 1971.  
After president Pompidou’s death in 1974, Mitterrand almost beat the centrist 
Giscard d’Estaing in the follow-up election (49% against 51%), and as a result 
the Left expected to win a majority in the 1978 parliamentary elections, which 
would de facto turn the president into a lame duck. This did not happen, and 
the lesson the Left drew was that the election programme required a bit more 
of an edge: it accused French capitalism of not being dynamic enough, 
producing both uncompetitive industries and high unemployment and 
inflation; the answer lay, according to this analysis, in the nationalisation of key 
industries and banks, as this was the only way to modernize and prepare them 
for increased competition in the Single European Market. Mitterrand, the 
candidate of the Left in 1981, won the presidential elections that year, and 
immediately embarked on an expansionary programme led by the Parisian 
centre, while also introducing decentralized buffering institutions designed to 
emulate the German economy (including, importantly, its low-inflation 
effects). Labour relations, regional policies and finance were reorganized to 
increase innovation, productivity and allocative efficiency and thus reduce the 
need for periodic devaluations. These policies failed in many respects (Levy 
1999; Hancké 2002: 37-56): neither unions nor employers were able to handle 
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the new governance responsibilities handed to them by law, banks were 
uneasy leaving the cosy financial shelter offered by the state, and regions 
became vacuous extensions of the centre without any of the local dynamism 
that decentralisation was supposed to spawn. French capitalism was, so it 
seemed, simply not transformable. The government responded to the emerging 
crisis by devaluing the Franc in 1982. At the occasion, Finance minister Jacques 
Delors pointed out that currency depreciations of this sort needed strong 
accompanying measures to assure others, and especially Germany, that France 
was serious about containing inflation (Favieu & Martin-Roland 1990: 489). As 
things got increasingly worse – both inflation and unemployment rose in 1982 
– the Left lost local and regional elections that year. Using data that covers both 
Giscard d'Estaing's presidency from October 1974 to May 1981, and the period 
under Mitterrand’s first two years of presidency until 1983, Lafay (1984: 345) 
shows that inflation seems to have a stable, negative effect on the popularity of 
the president. The year 1983 was the year of the second ‘rupture’, with 
socialism in one country this time. For a while, the Left of the PS stood its 
ground: the Cabinet was, in fact, totally divided between those who wished to 
pursue a consistent Keynesian policy of reflation and thus willing to risk 
French membership of the European Monetary System (the EMS, the 
immediate ancestor of EMU) as a result, and those who considered austerity 
and disinflation to be the basis for a sound economic policy that would allow 
the Franc to stabilize. By deciding to stay in the EMS, Mitterrand not only tied 
the currency to the Deutschmark (thus sacrificing all macroeconomic 
adjustment tools), but also imposed a drastic centrally led disinflation 
programme (Lordon 1998). Delors relied on the subservience of the Banque de 
France to quell sources of inflation in the system (leaving little doubt among 
the unions about an appropriate, i.e. disinflationary, wage rate). By the mid-
1980s, as a result, a disinflationary regime had taken root in France, and the 
inflation rate fell from 9.5% in 1983 to 3.3 in 1987). 
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By the mid-1980s, these different processes led to a very different landscape of 
economic policy-making. The average household had seen its disposable 
income rise dramatically in two decades, while the state remained for many an 
employer of last resort or the purveyor of income support in the case of job loss. 
That shifted the economic policy preferences of the electorate to the Right, as 
figure 14, which reports electoral support for orthodox policies, shows. At the 
same time, the Left lost elections at an alarming rate – only a few years after 
finally having conquered the Elysée! Turning the electoral tide required the 
Left to adopt a more orthodox economic policy platform, based on inflation 
fighting instead of full employment – and it used the (politically highly 
dependent) Banque de France as its key instrument for that. As a result, 
inflation rates fell rapidly in the second half of the 1980s, and have stayed very 
low since. Despite the decentralising fervour with which the Left had started 
in office, it ended by introducing monetarist modernisation from above. 
Figure 14.  The evolution of support for economic orthodoxy in France 
 Source: Orthodoxy support is the sum of [vote share for party i (=1,...,n) times economic orthodoxy of party i (=1,...,n)], for all political parties in an election (see detailed explanation in text near Figure 13). 
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Germany: Social-democratic monetarism 
Our third case is Germany, the home base of monetarism in Europe. In many 
ways, low inflation in Germany may seem impossible to explain – because it is 
overdetermined. The policy mix in the larger sense is impressive indeed: 
entrenched inflation fears harking back to the twenties, the independent 
Bundesbank, the German mark as the symbol of the post-war economic revival, 
and the strong interest organizations at the basis of German competitiveness. 
Add to that the fact that the social-democratic party, the SPD, had its damascene 
conversion as early as 1959 in the Bad Godesberg conference, where it accepted 
capitalism as the key organizing economic principle of the country, the absence 
of a serious threat on the Left for most of the post-war years, and that the trade 
unions are of the ‘responsible’ kind, aware of the macro-economic effects of 
their actions, and it would be hard to even begin to imagine high inflation. Yet 
the history of disinflation as pursued by the SPD in Germany maps, somewhat 
surprisingly perhaps, quite well onto our model.  
Despite everything that points in the opposite direction (not least the absence 
of a solid Keynesian tradition in German academia; see Allen 1989), the SPD 
remained a left-wing, Keynesian-inspired party for most of the 1960s: during 
the years in office after 1965 (in the Grand Coalition) and as a senior partner 
with the FDP from 1969 to 1982, the party pursued expansive policies where 
possible. Left voters in the 1970s attached more importance to unemployment 
relative to inflation than conservative voters (Kirchgässner 1991). The 
Bundesbank switched to monetary targeting in 1974, but once the trade unions 
understood that the central bank would retaliate against inflationary wage 
settlements, they moderated wage claims and the Bundesbank relaxed its 
stance. In the 1970s, as a result of electoral pressures, the SPD did not move to 
the Right (as could have been anticipated), but actually to the Left. After the 
1976 election, when the SPD lost almost 10% of its seats, Chancellor Helmut 
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Schmidt agreed to a fiscal stimulus package to combat rising unemployment 
(Notermans 2000: 177), and at the Bonn summit one year later, Germany even 
agreed to be the economic ‘locomotive’ of the world economy in a concerted 
fiscal expansion. For most of the 1960s and 1970s, therefore, the SPD remained 
a relatively traditional social-democratic party with a Keynesian 
macroeconomic orientation – with massive electoral success as a result (gaining 
40% or more of the popular vote and for many years between 40 and 47 per cent 
of the seats in the lower house).  
The fall of the Schmidt government in 1982 heralded a fundamental shift in the 
SPD’s approach to macroeconomic policy-making. The 1987 election was fought 
on traditional Left-Right terrain, with a large part of the SPD election 
programme based on standard wage increases and Keynesian policies for full 
employment. The SPD lost the election and in response shed its Keynesian 
cloak, emphasizing labour market flexibility and other supply-side measures 
(Notermans 2000: 228). This sealed the conversion of the social democrats to 
monetarism. 
These political developments took place against a background of wide-ranging 
yet slow-moving shifts in the economic fortunes of the electorate. Throughout 
the 1960s and early 1970s, unemployment remained solidly below 2%, and 
while it increased moderately during the remaining part of the 1970s, it was 
under 5% – very low by European standards at the time. More importantly, 
those in jobs saw their economic security increase significantly: measured as the 
OECD employment protection legislation (EPL) index, job security increased 
from 1.2 in 1960 to 1.4 in 1970 and 2.9 in 1975 and stayed at that level until the 
mid-1980s; union density increased from 32% in 1970 to nearly 35% in 1980; and 
wages increased significantly: between 1962 and 1969, for instance, hourly 
wages in manufacturing increased by more than 50% (Sutcliffe 1996: 145). 
Average annual working hours, in turn, fell almost 25% by 500 hours between 
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1950 and 1973 (Sutcliffe 1996: 147). While job security increased, savings shot up 
as a result of increased disposable income, and the rate of home ownership 
increased significantly from 29% in 1960 to 40% in 1980.  
By the early 1980s, the median voter in Germany was, as these figures reflect, 
relatively wealthy, relatively secure in his job and could rely on a generous 
welfare system if income were to fall as a result of unemployment, health or 
retirement. For him, the economic insecurity associated with the end of the war, 
reconstruction and the early 1950s was a distant memory by then. Erosion of the 
value of their assets through inflation was a far more important problem, and 
political parties, even on the Left, rapidly reflected that shift. By the mid-1980s, 
with the conversion of the SPD, all parties had become proponents of sound 
money policies. 
 
Sweden: Holding the fort 
Sweden offers our final case study. The country is interesting for the argument 
we are developing here for several reasons. One, it is a standard electoral system 
of proportional representation – but one in which one party, the social-
democratic SAP, dominated the political scene for almost all of the post-war era, 
often with large pluralities or even absolute parliamentary majorities. And 
secondly, despite the general affluence of the population and the political and 
institutional orientation towards full employment for most of the post-war 
period (levels and growth rates of GDP/cap in PPP terms are among the highest 
in the world and unemployment among the lowest), the SAP stubbornly 
resisted calls for a more restrictive policy regime until well into the 1980s and 
even the early 1990s (Notermans 1993). In other words, while the median voter’s 
concrete preoccupations objectively must have shifted to the Right, the 
hegemony of the social-democratic party was such that it could trump this and 
maintain a growth and full employment oriented regime, at least until the early 
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1990s. The case study thus also offers a mirror to our argument about party 
competition: when the dual threat of defection by the electorate (and by centrist 
parties) to the Right is absent or very weak, social-democratic parties retain 
important degrees of autonomy from the shifting preferences of the median 
voter. 
Let us start the analysis with the evolution of employment security and wealth 
of the median voter. Sweden since the Second World War offers an almost 
unique combination of several policies and institutions that increased and 
stabilised employment security for the bulk of the population at a high level: 
the relentless pursuit of full employment, the generalised rise in educational 
attainment, the very high union density rates and the strong position of trade 
unions in the domestic political economy more generally, the combination of 
relatively strong EPL and active retraining policies for the unemployed, 
coupled with generous unemployment benefits, and a large public sector as 
employer. For any voter who was employed, the potential cost of 
unemployment was low: it combined a low risk of unemployment with high 
actual income or replacement income. In our E-A model, E was therefore on a 
rapid downward trajectory.  
Yet despite the dramatic increase in the standard of living during the post-war 
boom years – real GDP/cap increased from $6739 (1990 dollars) in 1950 to over 
14000 dollars in 1975 (Maddison 2013 database) – few families were able to build 
up significant assets because of the high tax rates. Net household savings rates 
remained low as a result, at 4.5% of GDP in the 1950s and 2.1% in the 1970s 
(Henrekson et al. 1996: 258), and both levels of and growth in home ownership 
was and remains low as well (it only increased from about 40% in the 1970s to 
about 45% in the 2000s – Nickell 2006). The high tax rate and the redistribution 
that followed implied, of course, that the economic security of citizens remained 
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high: the universal welfare state, excellent educational system and government-
sponsored housing schemes took the place of private wealth in other countries. 
The social-democratic party in Sweden, the SAP, therefore did not come under 
pressure from the median voter the way centre-Left parties elsewhere in Europe 
did. Despite a low fear of unemployment and of the costs associated with job 
loss, the asset base of most Swedish households remained too narrow. Hibbs 
(1981: 40) found that inflation had no significant impact on electoral 
performance in the late 1960s and 1970s, and that the fall in electoral support 
for political leaders in response to higher unemployment was larger in Sweden 
than in the UK, France or Germany, while the fall in support in response to 
inflation was the lowest (Hibbs 1985: 184). While parties on the right adopted 
more orthodox economic policy platforms, the SAP did not do so before the 
1990s – and only to a modest degree afterwards (see figure 15). However, since 
the SAP remained the dominant party, in large measure because of the 
combination of vote-winning redistributive policies and increased job and 
income security, the direct effect of this electoral competition on party policy 
remained quite small. In fact, we can perhaps best understand the policies by 
‘bourgeois’ governments since the 1990s to liberalise the economy and privatise 
large parts of the state, including the welfare state, are in this context perhaps 
best understood as attempts to produce a more Right-wing median voter, with 
the aim of undermining the SAP’s electoral base. 
Figure 15 shows clearly that the economic orthodoxy of the SAP manifesto only 
peaked in the late 1990s – not only very late in comparative perspective but also, 
compared to the centre-Right party’s peak earlier in the post-war period, a very 
modest rise. This surprising finding makes more sense when considering the 
timing of the increase in security and access to home ownership alongside shifts 
in party programmes. Using the EPL index as an indicator, the former only 
started rising in the 1970s and continued to do so well into the 1990. Similarly, 
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home ownership remained low during that period, under 40% well into the 
1970s and only reached 45% in 2000. 
Figure 15.  Economic orthodoxy in the SAP and the  
Right party’s manifesto in Sweden, post-war period 
 Source: Orthodoxy support is the sum of [vote share for party i (=1,...,n) times economic orthodoxy of party i (=1,...,n)], for all political parties in an election (see detailed explanation in text near Figure 13). 
This interaction between the relative economic security of the median voter in 
Sweden throughout the post-war period and the relative insulation of the social-
democratic party from direct competition on the Right meant that the support 
for economic orthodoxy remained subdued in the country. After the 
inflationary scramble of the 1950s, which actually gave birth to the 
disinflationary centralized wage bargaining model that made Sweden famous 
in the literature on corporatism that emerged in the 1980s (Martin 1984), our 
index of support for economic orthodoxy only started to rise again in the 1990s, 
when inflation had become a wider problem as a result of an overheated 
economy. The financial and economic crisis of 1992 killed off inflation quickly, 
and public support for austerity waned as a result. 
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Figure 16.  The evolution of support for economic orthodoxy in Sweden 
 Source: Orthodoxy support is the sum of [vote share for party i (=1,...,n) times economic orthodoxy of party i (=1,...,n)], for all political parties in an election (see detailed explanation in text near Figure 13).  
This case study of Sweden teaches us two important lessons. One is that the 
basic argument that links disinflation to relative shifts in aversion to 
unemployment and to inflation helps understand how inflation can remain a 
distant electoral and policy problem if the asset base of the median voter 
remains low and the accumulation of wealth is collective rather than individual. 
Despite the very low actual threat to living standards and life chances that 
unemployment posed in post-war Sweden, the narrow asset base of the average 
household meant that A in our model was never able to replace E as the 
dominant concern for the electorate until late in the 1990s, i.e. 15 to 20 years later 
than it did in the other three countries examined here. The second is that social-
democratic parties could use a sustained and coherent strategy toward full 
employment and producing collective instead of individual wealth as a way of 
reaping electoral rewards that constituted a buffer against competition from the 
Right on economic policy. The dominant position of the SAP for almost the 
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entire post-war period is undoubtedly also in part the result of the success of its 
economic policies geared toward full employment and generalised welfare, 
which allowed the party to fend off attacks by the Right. Conversely, it is 
probably no surprise that support for SAP began to wane in the late 1990s and 
2000s when it adopted a programme that was indistinguishable in orientation 
from its competitors on the Right. As Table 4 shows, between 1994 and 2006, the 
party’s share of the vote collapsed from 45% to 35% (Volkens et al. 2014), exactly 
at the time that its economic orthodoxy score rose significantly. 
Table 4.  Election results Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP), 1994-2006 Election year Percentage vote 1994 45.3 1998 36.4 2002 39.9 2006 35.0 Source: Volkens et al. 2014.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The decades after the end of the Second World War witnessed an 
unprecedented increase in living standards for the vast majority of the 
population in all OECD countries (and beyond). Real incomes shot up, while 
the fear of unemployment – still a massive threat to average families as late as 
the 1930s – dwindled as a result of full employment policies, employment 
protection legislation, the policing role of trade unions, and the vast expansion 
of the welfare state. At the same time, disposable income increased everywhere, 
as did household savings, which were converted into wealth. As the asset base 
of average families grew and fear of unemployment subsided – two processes 
that took place simultaneously – the electorate changed profoundly. Painted 
with broad brush strokes, if an average citizen – the median voter – was deeply 
concerned about (un)employment in the early 1950s, by the late 1970s she was 
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at least as much and possibly more concerned with rising inflation, which was 
eroding the value of the assets she had accumulated.  
That rightward shift of the median voter was reflected in the economic policies 
adopted by the main parties. While both the centre-Left and the centre-Right 
were full-employment oriented in the early 1960s, by the mid-1970s, the centre-
Left was usually alone in that position. Electoral competition – elections are won 
in the centre, wherever that may move – forced social-democratic parties to the 
Right, and by the late 1980s most centre-Left parties had adopted more 
orthodox economic policy platforms, revolving around ‘sound money’ policies 
(cf. Przeworski & Sprague 1988). As a result of this shift, disinflation became 
entrenched across the political spectrum, control of inflation had become the 
primary policy goal, institutionalised in independent, conservative central 
banks, and inflation rates fell sharply everywhere and remained low since the 
early 1990s.  
Our findings imply, therefore, that it is not because other parties had adopted 
the correct macro-economic policies in the past, as the combination of ideational 
and new-classically orthodox arguments suggests, that social-democratic 
parties moved to follow them (the effects of these policies remain a topic for 
debate, not least since economic growth rates have been lower since the 
generalised introduction of more restrictive macro-economic policies – cf. Glyn 
2006), but because of party competition against the background of a changing 
electorate in terms of economic security.  In sum, this argument allows us to 
understand the general adoption of monetarist policies throughout the OECD, 
as we set out to do.  
Finally, two points for further research beyond the few remarks on that earlier 
in this paper. One, our argument turns much of the conventional wisdom in this 
area on its head. Both Keynesian and Kaleckian approaches in political 
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economy, as well as models derived from those, assume or imply a Phillips-
curve inspired inverse relationship between full employment and inflation. Put 
simply, if unemployment falls to very low levels, the bargaining power of 
workers increases and wages rise; employers pass on these cost increases to 
consumers as price hikes. These then feed back into wage negotiations as cost-
of-living adjustment and inflation begins to rise without an institutional check 
(see Carlin & Soskice 2006: 27-202 for the clearest version of the argument as a 
whole). We think that the relation between unemployment and inflation is more 
dynamic: the bargaining power of workers may have this effect, but only up to 
the point where the average worker, who we assume also to be (close to) the 
median voter, has accumulated assets that forces him to fear inflation more than 
threats to his employment status. What we need to specify here are the extra 
conditions that our model introduces and which have the effect of turning the 
Phillips curve-inspired theories on their head.  
Secondly, governments are exposed to many different pressures when they 
make decisions about policies to pursue. Among those are international 
contexts that might, and often do, limit their autonomy, new ideas about 
policies, and domestic partisan politics. Our paper does not claim that the latter 
is all that mattered; but it does point out that ignoring it leaves a big hole in our 
understanding of the Great Moderation and especially in our understanding of 
the political origins of the Great Moderation. The quasi-monopolisation of the 
debate on the causes of disinflation by economists (and by political scientists 
who only pay attention to economic variables) has made political scientists and 
political economists shy of wading into that debate. Our paper, so we hope, is a 
way to reopen this discussion on the politics of economic policies, including 
their slow-moving, long-term effects. The economy is, after all, far too serious 
to be left to economists.  
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Appendix 
Table A1.  Descriptive statistics, description and sources for OECD sample 
Variables N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Descriptions Sources 
Inflation 1,110 5.098 4.761 -4.480 31.02 Growth of Consumer Price Index (all items).Percentage change from previous year. Armingeon et al. 2015:14. 
Share of elderly 1,113 13.249 3.024 5.727 24.15 Population over 65 as a percentage of the whole population. Armingeon et al. 2015:27. 
Real GDP growth 1,092 3.048 2.796 -8.539 13.20 Percent change from previous year. Armingeon et al. 2015:13. 
Unemployment rate 1,113 5.743 4.044 0 25.13 Unemployment rate as a percentage of the civilian labour force. Armingeon et al. 2015:18. 
Openness 1,091 60.075 30.789 9.354 187.8 Measured as total trade (sum of import and export) as a percentage of GDP, in current prices. 
Armingeon et al. 2015:12. 
Central Bank Independence 849 .408 .189 0.0900 0.920 The Cukierman-Webb-Neyapti Index for Central Bank Independence Cukierman et al. 1992. Updated using Simone Polillo and Mauro F. 
Guillén, “Globalization Pressures and the State: The Global Spread of Central Bank 
Independence.” American 
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Variables N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Descriptions Sources Journal of Sociology 110(6) (May 2005):1764-1802. 
Wage coordination 1,056 3.168 1.358 1 5 Degrees of Coordination among different Institutions for Wage Setting. Visser 2013:9-10. 
Left control of cabinet 1,072 33.014 38.129 0 100 Cabinet posts of social-democratic and other left parties in percentage of total cabinet posts.  
Armingeon et al. 2015:3. 
Union density 1,032 41.151 19.86 7.600 100 Net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in employment. Armingeon et al. 2015:20. 
Adjusted bargaining 
coverage 
407 55.155 27.253 13 99 Bargaining Coverage, adjusted. Expressed in percentage. Armingeon et al. 2015 (but originally created by Jelle Visser) 
Union authority 941 0.440 0.210 0.1 0.9 Summary measure of formal authority of unions regarding wage setting at peak and sectoral level. 
ICTWSS - http://www.uva-aias.net/ 
Union concentration 923 0.311 0.114 0.113 0.587 Summary measure of concentration of unions at peak and sectoral level. ICTWSS - http://www.uva-aias.net/ 
Capital openness 871 1.440 1.267 -1.875 2.421 Index for the degree of openness in capital account transactions. The Chinn- Ito Index. Armingeon et al. 2015 
Structural unemployment 1073 1.987 2.017 0 7 Structural unemployment. OECD 
Home ownership 678 54.966 12.922 28 78 Housing owner occupation rate . Data created by Andrew Oswald 
EPL (allard index) 814 1.622 1.101 0 4.1 This series uses the OECD methodology generating an Allard, G. (2005), “Measuring Job Security 
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Variables N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Descriptions Sources index increasing on the range {0,5}. Over Time: In Search of a Historical Indicator”, Instituto de Empressa Working Paper WP-05. (Available from http://www.ie.edu/eng/claustro/claustro_working_papers.asp) 
Inflation aversion      This variable is a sum of the answers to two questions asking respondents whether inflation is their first priority (variable name: valpri1) and their second priority (second choice variable name: valpri2). The formulation of the question is as follows.  
“There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of <country> should be for the next ten years. <int.: show card ** - one answer only>   On this card are listed some of the goals to which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which of them you yourself consider the most important? and the next most important <goal>? 
Eurobarometer (2005) The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970 – 2002. Data Set Edition v2.0.1. Codebook and Unweighted Frequency Distributions updated by Iris Leim and Meinhard Moschner, ZA, Cologne. January 20, 2005. (codebook update as of June 17, 2009). By Hermann Schmitt, MZES Mannheim, Evi Scholz ZUMA Mannheim.  
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Variables N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Descriptions Sources 1. maintenance of law and order 2. giving the people more say in government decisions 3. fighting rising prices 4. protecting freedom of expression 103 8. dk, na 9. inap104 
Economic orthodoxy       Economic Orthodoxy Need for economically healthy government policy making. May include calls for: 
• Reduction of budget deficits; 
• Retrenchment in crisis; 
• Thrift and savings in the face of economic hardship; 
• Support for traditional economic institutions such as stock market and banking system; 
• Support for strong currency. 
Volkens, Andrea / Lehmann, Pola / Merz, Nicolas / Regel, Sven / Werner, Annika with Lacewell Onawa Promise / Schultze, Henrike (2014): The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG / CMP / MARPOR). Version 2014b. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).      
The Politics of Disinflation 
 
 60 
Table A2. Determinants of inflation rate Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) Note:  Parsimonious model Adding more controls Post-1978 Without fixed effects All IVs lagged once All IVs lagged twice Index of security -0.48* -0.44** -0.64** -0.27t -0.44** -0.48** 
(standard normal) (0.194) (0.143) (0.207) (0.148) (0.138) (0.128) GDP growth -0.37*** -0.34*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.06 0.09* 
(standard normal) (0.061) (0.033) (0.045) (0.042) (0.046) (0.041) Unemployment rate -0.46*** -0.54*** -0.59*** -0.28*** -0.59*** -0.53*** 
(standard normal) (0.106) (0.073) (0.113) (0.071) (0.071) (0.089) Left control of government  0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 
(standard normal)  (0.037) (0.044) (0.051) (0.044) (0.043) Union density   0.68*** 0.78*** 0.12 0.62*** 0.52** 
(standard normal)  (0.142) (0.191) (0.112) (0.143) (0.132) Trade openness  0.48* 0.26 -0.03 0.22 -0.07 
(standard normal)  (0.216) (0.204) (0.102) (0.223) (0.129) Capital openness  -0.32** -0.38* -0.55*** -0.35** -0.42*** 
(standard normal)  (0.110) (0.135) (0.098) (0.100) (0.076) CBI  -0.16* -0.06 -0.09t -0.08 0.02 
(standard normal)  (0.063) (0.058) (0.048) (0.063) (0.050) Constant 0.35*** 0.46*** 0.68*** 0.39** 0.45*** 0.44***  (0.045) (0.055) (0.159) (0.135) (0.043) (0.034) Observations 643 528 394 528 529 530 Number of countries 19 18 18 18 18 18 Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No Time effects No No No No No No R-squared within model 0.32 0.63 0.67 0.57 0.63 0.69 R-squared between model 0.38 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 R-squared overall model 0.05 0.16 0.10 0.42 0.21 0.34 
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